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CHAPTER 13 
 
IMMIGRATION LAW ENFORCEMENT AFTER 9/11 AND HUMAN RIGHTS 
 
Daniel Moeckli  
 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
In January 2002, the US Department of Justice announced the so-called Absconder 
Apprehension Initiative (AAI).
1
 The AAI is a programme designed to locate, arrest, 
and deport those the US government describes as ‘absconders’: that is, foreign 
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nationals who have been ordered to be deported but have failed to leave the United 
States.
2
 Over 300,000 such persons were thought to be in the United States at that 
time.
3
 However, these ‘absconders’ were not to be pursued equally under the AAI. 
Rather, the US authorities declared that, in order to assist the campaign against 
terrorism, they would focus on the enforcement of deportation orders against 
approximately 6,000 ‘priority absconders’ who ‘come from countries in which there 
has been Al Qaeda terrorist presence or activity’.4 Although the government never 
explicitly identified these countries, those treated as ‘priority absconders’ came from a 
list of states all of which – except for the Philippines – have predominantly Arab 
and/or Muslim populations.
5
  
  
As I will demonstrate, the AAI is just one in a series of immigration enforcement 
initiatives adopted in recent years by Western states in the name of preventing 
terrorism. Typically, these initiatives target particular groups of foreign nationals 
based on their country of origin or nationality. The purpose of this Chapter is to 
examine the impacts that these immigration measures have on human rights, in 
particular the right to non-discrimination. To do this, the Chapter looks at the post-
9/11 immigration policies of three Western democracies: the United States, the United 
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Kingdom, and Germany, all of them states with relatively large immigrant 
communities.
6
 
  
In Section II, I show how governments, building on the historic link between the 
administration of immigration control and national security, have turned immigration 
law and policy into one of their central tools in the ‘war on terror’. The 
‘securitisation’ of migration and refugee policy permeates both the international and 
national level, manifesting itself in the tightening of immigration laws, the rigorous 
enforcement of these laws, and the subordination of the immigration machinery to 
national security agencies. Automatically associating foreign nationals with the 
terrorist threat, these changes have profound impacts for the human rights of 
immigrants in Western states. 
  
As Section III demonstrates, not all immigrants have been equally affected by these 
changes. Just like any other preventive anti-terrorism policy, the use of immigration 
powers must inevitably rely on profiles of the potential terrorists. With the dominant 
depiction of the current terrorist threat being linked to wider cultural differences, 
characteristics such as nationality, national origin, and, at least indirectly, race, 
ethnicity, and religion have become the key components of such profiles. Thus, as 
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evidenced by numerous policies adopted by the United States, the United Kingdom, 
and Germany, contemporary immigration law enforcement efforts focus on those 
immigrants who come from predominantly Arab and/or Muslim states. 
  
Section IV examines whether the differences in treatment based on country of origin 
or nationality, race, ethnicity, and religion that such selective immigration 
enforcement efforts involve, are compatible with the right to non-discrimination as 
guaranteed by international human rights standards and national law. The answer to 
this question depends, in particular, on the applicable standard of review and on 
whether singling out immigrants from predominantly Arab and/or Muslim states can 
be deemed a proportionate means to prevent and investigate terrorist activity. 
 
II. IMMIGRATION LAW AND POLICY AS AN ANTI-TERRORISM TOOL 
States have often responded to national security threats, including terrorist activities, 
by trying to keep out of their territory potentially dangerous foreign nationals and by 
removing, or imposing certain restrictions on, those already in the country. In the 
wake of September 11, the use of immigration powers for national security purposes 
has received further impetus. 
 
A. Before September 11 
According to the traditional conception of security, it is the state that is the principal 
object of security, as well as its guarantor, with other states constituting the main 
source of security threats. This ‘national security’ model of security centres on the 
defence of the state’s borders and institutions from external aggression, invariably 
seen as somehow linked to other states. Therefore, governments have always used the 
control of immigration as a central tool for the protection of national security. 
  
During the so-called Red Scare in the wake of the First World War, for instance, the 
US authorities relied heavily on immigration laws, in particular the Alien Control Act 
of 1918, to exclude, detain, and deport perceived left-wing radicals.
7
 Similarly, 
immigration powers were one of the most important weapons employed in the anti-
communist ‘witch-hunt’ of the McCarthy era of the 1950s.8 The United Kingdom 
reacted to the outbreak of the First World War with the introduction of the Aliens 
Restriction Act 1914, granting the executive virtually unfettered power to exclude 
foreign nationals and restrict their freedom of movement,
9
 and with the creation of a 
machinery of immigration control wedded to the state’s security apparatus.10 After the 
war, the 1914 legislation was extended and deployed against, among others, suspected 
communists.
11
 More recently, the British government used immigration powers for 
national security purposes by deporting a number of Iraqis and Palestinians at the start 
of the 1991 Gulf War.
12
 Finally, the internment of ‘enemy aliens’ has been, in many 
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states, a regular feature during times of war.
13
 These are just some of the examples 
demonstrating that, ‘[t]he administration of immigration control has since its 
inception been inextricably linked with national security.’14 
  
This close link has also been evident in the specific field of counter-terrorism, even 
prior to September 11. Despite the rise of the concept of human security in the mid-
1990s, counter-terrorism policies have remained squarely within a traditional security 
paradigm.
15
 Immigrants have long been caught up in this paradigm as objects against 
which states perceived they need protection. Extensive border control powers, for 
example, were already part of the series of British Prevention of Terrorism 
(Temporary Provisions) Acts passed between 1974 and 1989,
16
 as well as of the 
Terrorism Act 2000.
17
 In Germany, the authorities reacted to the 1972 terrorist attack 
at the Munich Olympics by issuing deportation orders against Palestinians considered 
to be security risks.
18
 Finally, in the United States, the anti-terrorism law adopted after 
the Oklahoma City bombing of 1995, the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty 
Act, which is still in force today, mainly consists of measures that are exclusively 
applicable to immigrants.
19
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 B. After September 11 
 
In the wake of September 11, this link between counter-terrorism measures and 
immigration control policies has been further reinforced, both at the international and 
the national levels. The alternative human security approach, popularised in the mid-
1990s and gaining momentum leading up to September 11, has been pushed aside for 
a reinvigoration of traditional national security ideals, as terrorism has become a 
priority.  
 
  
At the international level, Security Council Resolution 1373, the centrepiece of the 
UN’s response to September 11, requires all member states to adopt a number of 
immigration measures designed to prevent terrorism.
20
 In particular, states are 
required to establish effective border controls and to regulate the issuance of identity 
papers and travel documents,
21
 ensure that those who have participated in, or planned, 
terrorist acts are not granted refugee status,
22
 and make sure that refugee status is not 
abused by those involved in terrorism.
23
 In order to implement these obligations, the 
Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTC), the body monitoring compliance with 
Resolution 1373, has asked states to introduce legislation covering all these aspects as 
well as to put in place effective and coordinated executive machinery, including 
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customs, immigration, and border controls, to prevent the movement of terrorists.
24
 
After the London bombings of 7 July 2005, the Security Council reaffirmed these 
requirements in its Resolution 1624, calling on all states ‘to strengthen the security of 
their international borders, including by combating fraudulent travel documents and, 
to the extent attainable, by enhancing terrorist screening.’25 
  
In accordance with these requirements, numerous states, including those considered in 
this Chapter, have considerably tightened their immigration laws in recent years. In 
the United States, the USA Patriot Act made changes to the immigration law that are 
designed to improve border controls
26
 and enhance the powers of the immigration 
authorities.
27
 In particular, the definition of terrorism contained in the Immigration 
and Nationality Act, and thus the class of non-citizens who can be barred from 
claiming asylum and removed, has been greatly expanded.
28
 Furthermore, the 
Attorney General and the immigration authorities have been given wider authority to 
indefinitely detain immigrants who allegedly endanger national security.
29
 In the 
United Kingdom, the Immigration, Asylum and Nationality Act 2006 introduced a 
number of changes designed to provide the government with additional tools to deal 
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with persons considered national security threats. Thus, the act authorises the Home 
Secretary to deprive persons of their British citizenship (or right of abode) if s/he is 
‘satisfied that deprivation is conducive to the public good’.30 Once stripped of their 
citizenship, these persons will naturally be subject to deportation powers. Next, the 
Act provides that in cases where deportation orders are made on national security 
grounds, an appeal can only be brought after removal.
31
 Finally, the Act makes it 
easier to deny asylum claims of suspected terrorists by significantly widening the 
scope of the exclusion clause of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of 
Refugees (1951 Refugee Convention),
32
 while at the same time restricting the scope 
of appeals against rejection of an asylum claim on these grounds.
33
 In Germany, large 
parts of the Anti-Terrorism Act introduced after September 11 are aimed exclusively 
at immigrants, increasing border control powers, creating new grounds for exclusion 
and expulsion, and providing for enhanced data sharing in the field of immigration.
34
 
In addition, shortly after the terrorist attacks in Madrid of 11 March 2004, the 
Zuwanderungsgesetz (Immigration Act)
35
 was passed, further extending the 
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government’s power to expel foreign citizens on national security grounds.36 For 
example, the authorities are now allowed to expel foreign nationals who ‘endorse or 
promote terrorist acts’ or incite hatred against sections of the population.37 The Act 
has also introduced a new summary procedure for the removal of immigrants who 
allegedly pose a terrorist threat.
38
 
  
The crucial role that immigration policy plays in contemporary efforts against 
terrorism is also evidenced by the rigorous enforcement of these new, as well as pre-
existing, immigration powers for anti-terrorism purposes as an alternative (or adjunct) 
to the instigation of criminal proceedings. The US government has explicitly stated 
that it regards immigration law enforcement as one of the central planks of its fight 
against terrorism.
39
 Accordingly, the filing of immigration charges and, conversely, 
the offering of immigration benefits (such as special visas and relief from removal) as 
a reward for cooperation are now common tools used in terrorism investigations in the 
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United States.
40
 Furthermore, immigration law powers have been used in hundreds of 
cases to detain foreign nationals in connection with terrorism investigations.
41
 The US 
immigration authorities have also considerably tightened their policies concerning, for 
example, the closing of deportation hearings to the public, denial of bond, and 
enforcement of deportation orders in cases allegedly involving national security.
42
 
  
Likewise, after the London bombings, the then British Prime Minster announced a 
tougher stance on immigration law enforcement: ‘The rules of the game have 
changed. If you come to this country from abroad, don’t meddle with extremism, 
because if you do, or get engaged with it, you are going to go back out again.’43 Part 
of this new approach has been the publication of a list of certain, widely defined, 
‘unacceptable terrorism behaviours’ that will be treated as grounds for exclusion and 
deportation from the United Kingdom.
44
 That the British authorities may readily use 
their increased immigration powers as a comfortable alternative to the criminal law 
has been demonstrated in the so-called ‘Ricin case’: the four Algerians acquitted by 
the jury from terrorist charges in this case were subsequently detained pending 
deportation.
45
 Importantly, the British government has made clear its intention to 
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deport foreign terrorist suspects even to states that are notorious for practising torture. 
As part of this strategy, it intervened in several cases before the European Court of 
Human Rights involving deportations,
46
 arguing that the Court should reverse its 
seminal ruling in Chahal v. United Kingdom.
47
 In the Chahal case, the Court had held 
that, even if someone is a threat to national security, they may not be removed to a 
state where they would face a real risk of being subjected to torture or inhuman 
treatment.
48
 In its judgment of February 2008 in Saadi v. Italy, the Grand Chamber of 
the European Court of Human Rights rejected the British government’s attempt to 
overturn Chahal.
49
 The second prong of the government’s efforts to overcome the 
restraints of Chahal is the seeking of diplomatic assurances from the states of origin 
of terrorist suspects that those deported will not be subjected to ill-treatment. The 
United Kingdom has concluded agreements that systematise the use of such 
diplomatic assurances with Jordan,
50
 Libya,
51
 Lebanon
52
 and Algeria;
53
 negotiations 
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to conclude similar agreements with other states are proceeding.
54
 To give further 
support to this policy, the British government, together with several other states, 
launched an initiative within the Council of Europe to develop an international 
instrument that would set minimum standards for the use of diplomatic assurances.
55
 
The Council of Europe’s Group of Specialists on Human Rights and the Fight against 
Terrorism, however, rejected this proposal because, among other reasons, it believed 
that ‘such an instrument could be seen as weakening the absolute nature of the 
prohibition of torture or as a Council of Europe legitimisation of the use of diplomatic 
assurances.’56 The United Kingdom has now turned to the European Union in its 
efforts to receive international endorsement of its diplomatic assurances policy.
57
 
  
In Germany, where enforcement of the immigration laws is entrusted to the Länder 
(federal states), the authorities have aggressively used their wide powers under the 
Zuwanderungsgesetz to exclude and deport foreign nationals on national security 
grounds. In 2005, it was estimated that several hundred, or even up to 2,000, 
suspected terrorists would be deported under the new powers.
58
 The Government of 
Bavaria has established a specific working group, the so-called Arbeitsgruppe 
BIRGiT,
59
 which is tasked with ‘making Islamist extremists leave the country.’60 In 
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Murat Kurnaz, a Turkish citizen who had been born and raised in Germany, from 
returning after his release from Guantánamo Bay– a decision that was later overturned 
by a Bremen administrative court.
62
 
  
These developments at the legislative and law enforcement levels go hand in hand 
with significant institutional changes, increasingly subordinating the immigration 
machinery to the fight against terrorism. Perhaps the clearest example of this is the 
dissolution of the US Immigration and Naturalization Service, the federal agency once 
responsible for immigration, and the integration of most of its components into the 
newly created Department of Homeland Security, whose primary objective is the 
prevention of terrorist attacks in the United States.
63
 This major administrative 
reorganisation is emblematic of the fact that immigration policy has now become 
merely one aspect of the provision of ‘homeland security’. Furthermore, since 
                                                                                                                                            
Innern (Bavarian Ministry for the Interior). For a description of the Working Group’s activities and 
procedures, see W. Buggisch and W. Knorz, ‘Terrorismusbekämpfung einmal anders: Die AG BIRGiT 
und das Ausländerrecht als Instrument zur Bekämpfung des islamistischen Terrorismus und 
Extremismus’, Kriminalistik, 4 (2006) 226. 
60
 See the website of the Working Group, available at: 
www.stmi.bayern.de/sicherheit/innere/sicherleben/detail/11749/ (‘Die Arbeitsgruppe hat die Aufgabe, 
islamistische Extremisten konsequent zur Ausreise zu bringen.’) (last accessed 10 Aug. 2008). 
61
 Bayerisches Innenministerium, ‘Pressemitteilung Nr 238/07: 70 Ausweisungsbescheide gegen 
Gefährder, 45 Aufenthaltsbeendigungen’, 11 July 2007. 
62
 Verwaltungsgericht der Freien Hansestadt Bremen, decision of 30 Nov. 2005, Case No. 4 K 1013/05. 
63
 T.W. Donovan, ‘The American Immigration System: A Structural Change with a Different 
Emphasis’, International Journal of Refugee Law, 17 (2005), 574. 
September 11, the traditional separation between, on the one hand, immigration and, 
on the other, criminal law enforcement responsibilities has been increasingly blurred 
through the enhanced involvement of criminal law enforcement officers in 
immigration enforcement.
64
 It is similarly revealing that in the United Kingdom 
counter-terrorism and immigration responsibilities were, at least for the first few years 
after September 11, entrusted to one and the same Minister of State.
65
 In Germany, 
the federal government established in 2005 a coordination mechanism that is designed 
to facilitate the transfer of information from the security services to the immigration 
authorities.
66
 In particular, this body will advise the immigration authorities of cases 
of foreign nationals who potentially have a ‘terrorist background’.67 
  
Several elements explain the increased reliance on immigration powers as a means to 
counter terrorism. First, governments may see immigration control as a particularly 
effective tool because it allows them to bypass the safeguards of the criminal justice 
system, including access to courts and assistance of a lawyer. The procedural 
safeguards that apply in the immigration setting are generally less strict; both under 
the British Immigration, Asylum and Nationality Act 2006 and the summary removal 
procedure introduced by the German Zuwanderungsgesetz, for example, the scope of 
                                                 
64
 Migration Policy Institute, America’s Challenge, 80-86. 
65
 The post, entitled ‘Minister of State for Citizenship, Immigration and Counter-Terrorism’, was held, 
first, by Beverley Hughes and, later, by Des Browne. 
66
 The Working Group, called Arbeitsgruppe ‘Statusrechtliche Begleitmassnahmen’ (AG Status), is 
based in the Gemeinsames Terrorismusabwehrzentrum (Common Centre for the Defence from 
Terrorism). See, Bundesministerium des Innern, Praktiker-Erfahrungsaustausch im Rahmen der 
Evaluierung des Zuwanderungsgesetzes am 30. und 31. März 2006, 66-68; ‘Informationsaustausch 
zwischen Sicherheitsbehörden und BAMF’, Asylmagazin 12/2006, available at: www.asyl.net (last 
accessed 10 Aug. 2008). 
67
 Ibid. 
judicial review on appeal is severely limited.
68
 Second, and related to this, it will 
normally be easier for the law enforcement authorities to meet the threshold for the 
use of immigration powers than to substantiate a terrorism charge. For an expulsion, 
for example, it must only be demonstrated that the person in question has engaged in 
some loosely defined behaviour that is taken as indicative that he or she poses a threat 
to national security.
69
 Third, the broad discretion that the judiciary generally accords 
governments in the field of immigration law, discussed in Section III.A below, means 
that there is wide scope for selective enforcement of the respective powers.  
  
While these rationales have already influenced governmental anti-terrorism policies 
for some time, after September 11 two additional elements have further reinforced the 
trend towards the use of immigration measures as an anti-terrorism tool. First, the 
contemporary terrorist threat is generally portrayed as inherently linked to a 
fundamental civilisational challenge from abroad.
70
 This has led states to rely 
increasingly on anti-terrorism strategies that are targeted at those who try to enter the 
country or have entered recently. Such policies are not only designed to incapacitate 
potential terrorists, but also to deter them from entering, or staying, in the first place. 
Second, the adoption of measures that are directed against immigrants is a politically 
convenient way of reacting to national security crises.
71
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To conclude, immigration policy has been radically reshaped in the wake of 
September 11. Immigration control now not only commonly serves as an additional 
weapon in the anti-terrorism arsenal but has been almost completely subordinated to 
counter-terrorism policy. This ‘securitisation’ of migration and refugee policy has 
profound impacts on the situation of immigrants to the Western world and their 
human rights. The use of immigration law as a means to prevent terrorism 
automatically associates immigration with the terrorist threat and thus contributes to 
the social construction of immigrants, including refugees and asylum-seekers, as 
suspected terrorists. This portrayal of immigrants as potential terrorists, in turn, makes 
restrictions of their fundamental rights appear more acceptable. The UN Special 
Rapporteur on the Human Rights of Migrants noted in 2003 that ‘[d]uring the period 
under review, the Special Rapporteur has observed that the strengthening of security 
policies and the tendency to consider migration as a matter falling under State security 
plans pose a threat to the human rights of migrants.’72 She later reinforced this 
observation by pointing out that ‘[t]he concept that immigration is a security issue has 
continued to gain ground since 11 September 2001 and has taken precedence over all 
other issues, including human rights. The erosion of rights sometimes caused by anti-
terrorist measures affects immigrants in particular.’73 The myriad immigration 
restrictions adopted in the name of preventing terrorism impact upon a whole range of 
migrants’ fundamental rights. The expansion of the category of non-citizens who can 
be barred from claiming asylum on national security grounds, for instance, affects the 
right to seek asylum; registration for immigration purposes impacts upon the right to 
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privacy; immigration detention restricts the right to liberty; exclusion based on 
‘unacceptable terrorism behaviours’ may affect the freedom of expression; 
deportation may touch upon the right to family life and the freedom from torture. Yet 
even though the human rights of all immigrants have come under increased pressure 
after September 11, one category of foreign nationals is considered especially suspect 
and thus made to bear the brunt of the immigration restrictions introduced in the ‘war 
on terror’. 
III. SELECTIVITY IN THE ENFORCEMENT 
Just as the tightening of immigration laws and policies as a reaction to national 
security crises has a long history, so have the selective design and enforcement of 
such restrictions. After the events of September 11, the trend towards selectivity has 
intensified. 
 
A. Before September 11 
Among the key factors driving immigration policies of the contemporary state have 
always been considerations as to the national or ethnic origin, race, and religion of the 
immigrant population. In the United States, explicit policies of favouring some ethnic 
groups over others go as far back as the late nineteenth century, when Congress 
passed a string of selective exclusion laws, directed primarily at Chinese 
immigrants.
74
 Efforts to influence the ethnic composition of the immigrant population 
have continued to characterise US immigration law in the twentieth century, ranging 
from a quota system based upon the national origins of the existing US population 
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(decidedly favouring immigrants from Northern European states) to the so-called 
‘diversity visa program’.75 In the United Kingdom, post-Second World War 
immigration policy was also largely designed to limit non-white immigration, with the 
Commonwealth Immigrants Acts of 1962 and 1968 and the Immigration Act 1971 as 
the cornerstones of this policy.
76
 Similarly, German immigration laws have always 
rested on the axiom that Deutschland ist kein Einwanderungsland (‘Germany is not a 
country of immigration’).77 These laws draw distinctions between different categories 
of immigrants according to their ethnic ties, most clearly reflected in their 
expansiveness toward ethnic German immigrants from Eastern Europe and their 
restrictiveness toward non-German immigrants.
78
 Finally, the same kinds of 
distinctions are manifest in the European Union’s common visa scheme, dividing the 
world into two categories of states: those whose nationals require a visa to enter the 
Union (‘black list’) and those whose nationals’ entry is considered desirable (‘white 
list’); almost all the states with a predominantly black or Muslim population are on 
the ‘black list’.79 
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In recent years, more subtle forms of race and national origin bias made at the law 
enforcement level have become increasingly significant, gradually replacing these 
explicit, de jure classifications. Today, it is often on the basis of immigration laws 
that are neutral on the surface that certain ethnic groups are singled out.
80
 In the 
United States, the Supreme Court has, to some extent, sanctioned such selectivity, 
holding that in the enforcement of the immigration laws – as opposed to criminal law 
enforcement – ethnic appearance may be lawfully considered as a relevant factor, as 
long as it is not the only criterion used.
81
 The US immigration authorities therefore 
regularly rely on ethnicity and national origin when stopping persons in the border 
area
82
 or enforcing other immigration powers.
83
 Similarly, the British Race Relations 
Act includes a clause permitting authorities to discriminate on grounds of nationality 
or ethnic or national origin (but not race) in carrying out asylum, immigration, and 
nationality functions if authorised by a minister
84
 – a provision described as 
‘incompatible with the very principle of non-discrimination’ by the UN Committee on 
the Elimination of Racial Discrimination.
85
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It is especially during national security crises that states have turned to race, national 
or ethnic origin, and, in some cases, religion as proxies to define certain groups of 
immigrants as particularly suspect. During the Second World War, for example, the 
United States interned Japanese nationals, as well as US citizens of Japanese ancestry, 
in their tens of thousands, whereas Germans and Italians were spared blanket 
internment.
86
 More recently, the US authorities introduced special reporting 
requirements for Iranian students during the Tehran hostage crisis of 1979
87
 and 
photographing and fingerprinting requirements for all entering Iraqi and Kuwaiti 
nationals during the 1991 Gulf War.
88
 
  
In the specific field of counter-terrorism, similar patterns had already emerged prior to 
September 11. Hillyard has demonstrated how the far-reaching border control powers 
of the British anti-terrorism laws passed in the 1970s and 1980s disproportionately 
affected Irish/Catholic people travelling between Britain and Ireland.
89
 In the United 
States, the immigration powers of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act 
of 1996 were almost exclusively deployed against Arabs and Muslims.
90
 
 
                                                 
86
 See, Korematsu v. United States 323 US 214 (1944); Migration Policy Institute, America’s 
Challenge, 122-31. 
87
 See, Narenji v. Civiletti 617 F2d 745 (DC Cir, 1979). 
88
 Human Rights Watch, Freedom of Expression and the War: Press and Speech Restrictions in the 
Gulf and F.B.I. Activity in U.S. Raise First Amendment Issues, 28 Jan. 1991. 
89
 P. Hillyard, Suspect Community: People’s Experience of the Prevention of Terrorism Acts in Britain 
(London: Pluto Press, 1993), 13-67. 
90
 M. J. Whidden, ‘Unequal Justice: Arabs in America and United States Antiterrorism Legislation’, 
Fordham Law Review, 69 (2001), 2825; Akram, ‘Scheherezade Meets Kafka’. 
B.  After September 11 
The September 11 attacks have led states to make country of origin or nationality, 
race, ethnicity, and religion key components of their immigration law enforcement 
efforts: immigration authorities direct their increased powers listed in Section II above 
primarily at those who match a profile based on a combination of these elements, 
often conflating nationality with religion and race by targeting immigrants from states 
with significant Muslim and Arab populations. 
  
This is most clearly evidenced in the immigration law enforcement strategy of the US 
authorities, which have adopted a series of policies and practices that single out 
certain immigrants based on their country of origin or nationality and, at least 
indirectly (through the choice of the targeted countries), their race, ethnicity, and 
religion. 
  
First, in November 2001 the US Department of Justice initiated a project to interview 
‘aliens whose characteristics were similar to those responsible for the attacks.’91 
Under this so-called Voluntary Interview Program, male immigrants, who were not 
suspected of any criminal activity, were selected for questioning on the sole basis of 
fulfilling the following ‘common-sense criteria’92: they were of a certain age, had 
entered the United States after January 2000, and originated from countries ‘in which 
intelligence indicated that there was an al Qaeda terrorist presence or activity’.93 
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Although the authorities did not identify these countries, almost all of the 8,000 men 
eventually interviewed were Arab and/or Muslim.
94
 In late 2002, in anticipation of the 
attack against Iraq, the programme was extended to question several thousand Iraqi-
born people.
95
  
  
Second, in June 2002 the National Security Entry-Exit Registration System was 
announced, imposing fingerprinting, photographing, and registration requirements for 
all males who are citizens of, or were born in, certain designated countries. These 
requirements apply not only to those from designated countries entering the United 
States but also to those already present within the United States, through a ‘call-in’ 
registration.
96
 By January 2003, the list of states whose nationals are automatically 
defined as posing an ‘elevated national security risk’ and are therefore subject to 
special registration had grown to twenty-five. All of them – except for North Korea – 
are states with predominantly Arab and/or Muslim populations.
97
  
  
Third, the years following September 11 have seen a massive rise in deportation 
orders for immigrants from predominantly Muslim countries, whilst the 
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corresponding figure for other immigrants has remained more or less stable.
98
 For 
example, although the total number of deportation orders in the United States 
decreased by about 16 per cent in the first year after September 11, the number of 
Egyptians who were ordered to be deported increased by 201 per cent and that of 
Jordanians by 144 per cent.
99
 This national origin bias is also evident in the 
enforcement of deportation orders: as explained in the Introduction to this Chapter, 
the AAI, launched in January 2002, prioritised the enforcement of deportation against 
those 2 per cent of deportable persons who originate from Arab and/or Muslim 
countries. 
  
Fourth, on the eve of war with Iraq, the Department of Homeland Security announced 
that, as part of its so-called Operation Liberty Shield, all asylum-seekers ‘from nations 
where al-Qaeda, al-Qaeda sympathizers, and other terrorist groups are known to have 
operated’ would be automatically detained, without the opportunity to have the need 
for their detention individually assessed.
100
 Although the authorities refused to 
disclose the list of affected states, the available information indicates that nearly all of 
them were states with a predominantly Muslim population.
101
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Fifth and finally, the vast majority of those arrested in the post-September 11 
preventive detention campaign were immigrants from states with a predominantly 
Muslim population, primarily Pakistan, Egypt, Jordan, and Yemen.
102
 These hundreds 
of Muslim men were arrested on minor immigration charges that would not normally 
warrant arrest, they were detained for exceptionally long periods, and held in 
conditions of confinement not imposed on similarly situated detainees.
103
  
  
In European countries, including the United Kingdom and Germany, immigration 
authorities also increasingly rely on the country of origin or nationality, race, 
ethnicity, and religion to select the targets of their enforcement efforts – although 
generally in a less explicit manner than the US authorities. In the United Kingdom, 
the immigration detention powers of the law adopted as a reaction to the September 
11 attacks, the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act (ATCSA) 2001, were used 
exclusively against Muslim men coming from such countries as Algeria, Morocco, 
and Egypt.
104
 Likewise, the more recently adopted tougher stance on exclusion and 
deportation has primarily affected citizens of Middle Eastern and North African 
states,
105
 in particular Islamic clerics described as ‘hate preachers’.106  
 
In Germany, the immigration authorities in some of the Länder have adopted a policy 
of requiring immigrants from several specified countries to go through an additional, 
particularly stringent, national security vetting process before they can be granted a 
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residence permit or renewal thereof. In Bavaria, applicants for a residence permit have 
to complete a special security evaluation questionnaire if they come from states that 
are associated with ‘an increased probability that potential perpetrators of terrorist 
acts originate from there.’107 The Bavarian government has refused to disclose the list 
of these so-called ‘problem states’, citing national security reasons.108 The 
Government of Hamburg has instructed its immigration authorities to subject 
immigrants from certain Arab and African states aged between 16 and 40 to an 
especially strict vetting procedure, including automatic background checks by the 
intelligence services for possible connections with terrorist organisations.
109
 The 
government estimated that about 8,700 foreign nationals would be affected by this 
special procedure.
110
 In Saxony, ‘persons of Arab origin’ are required to complete a 
special questionnaire when applying for a residence permit; this questionnaire is then 
passed on to the intelligence service for verification.
111
 As far as expulsion is 
concerned, German authorities have, as explained before, explicitly defined the 
targets of their aggressive policy of deportation as ‘Islamist extremists’ or ‘dangerous 
Islamists’.112 Among those deported have been a number of so-called ‘hate 
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preachers’, including the high-profile cases of the self-styled ‘caliph of Cologne’, 
Metin Kaplan,
113
 and the imam of a Frankfurt mosque, Said Khobaib Sadat.
114
 
  
Various factors explain why the selective enforcement of immigration laws against 
those coming from countries with predominantly Arab and/or Muslim populations has 
become one of the central weapons in the anti-terrorism arsenal. Most importantly, the 
now dominant approach to combating terrorism, of which the use of immigration 
control measures is a typical manifestation, focuses on the prediction and prevention 
of risks and thus inevitably relies on profiles of potential terrorists.
115
 Such profiles 
are constructed in a process that is shaped by the threat perceptions and policy 
objectives prevalent among the higher levels of government, the intelligence agencies, 
and the police, which, in turn, both influence and are influenced by the preoccupations 
of the mass media.
116
 Since the terrorist threat is now generally depicted as being 
reflective of wider cultural differences, nationality, national or ethnic origin, race, and 
religion have become the central elements of contemporary terrorist profiles.
117
 
Immigrants who match these criteria are therefore treated as particularly suspect. In 
addition, the focus of immigration law enforcement is also determined by questions of 
political feasibility. Governments may, for example, be reluctant to direct 
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enforcement efforts, such as registration programmes, against citizens of powerful 
Western states, thereby jeopardising diplomatic relations. The use of terrorist profiles 
that are based on such highly political considerations is particularly widespread in the 
field of immigration. This is no coincidence; as the following section demonstrates, 
the executive has traditionally enjoyed virtually unfettered discretion to selectively 
enforce its powers in this field. 
 
IV. CONFORMITY WITH THE RIGHT TO NON-DISCRIMINATION 
Selective immigration law enforcement efforts adopted for anti-terrorism purposes 
such as those described in the previous section treat different categories of foreign 
nationals differently based on their country of origin or nationality, race, ethnicity, 
religion, or a combination of these elements. This section assesses the compatibility of 
such differential treatment with the human right to non-discrimination.  
  
All the major human rights treaties, including the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (ICCPR),
118
 which has been ratified by the United States, the United 
Kingdom, and Germany, and the European Convention for the Protection of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR),
119
 ratified by the United Kingdom and 
Germany, prohibit discrimination on all the grounds listed above. Discrimination 
based on race, colour, descent, or national or ethnic origin is also prohibited by the 
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination 
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2, 26. 
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(ICERD),
120
 which has been ratified by all the states at issue. In addition, to the extent 
that foreign nationals fall within the scope of protection of the 1951 Refugee 
Convention, the explicit prohibition of discrimination on the grounds of race, religion, 
or country of origin contained in that Convention applies.
121
 Although the United 
States has not signed the 1951 Refugee Convention, it has ratified the 1967 Protocol 
relating to the Status of Refugees, which obliges states to apply the substantive 
provisions of the 1951 Refugee Convention to all refugees.
122
 The prohibition on the 
grounds of race and religion is also part of customary international law.
123
 
Importantly, non-discrimination is also guaranteed by the national laws of all the 
states at issue. The United States and Germany have codified this guarantee in their 
written constitutions.
124
 In the United Kingdom, equality before the law is considered 
to be a fundamental principle of justice,
125
 and the prohibition of discrimination of the 
ECHR has been incorporated into domestic law by way of the Human Rights Act 
1998. 
  
States are permitted to make certain distinctions between citizens and non-citizens in 
the context of immigration.
126
 However, this does not mean that those subject to a 
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state’s immigration powers do not enjoy the protection of the non-discrimination 
guarantee. Instead, all the relevant non-discrimination standards, including those 
contained in national laws, apply not only to citizens but also to foreign nationals, 
irrespective of whether their presence in the host state is lawful or not.
127
 As a 
consequence, measures relating to the control of immigration and the expulsion of 
foreign nationals may not involve differential treatment based on grounds such as 
country of origin or nationality, race, ethnicity, or religion.
128
 For the ICERD, the UN 
Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination has expressly stated that the 
prohibition of discrimination on the basis of race, colour, descent, or national or 
ethnic origin extends to the field of immigration and that states thus have to ensure 
that immigration and deportation policies do not discriminate among non-citizens 
based on any of these grounds.
129
 Further, it has made it clear that the prohibition of 
discrimination of the ICERD also applies to measures taken in the fight against 
terrorism.
130
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That the right to non-discrimination is especially prone to violation when states rely 
on immigration control to counter terrorism has been highlighted by the European 
Commission against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI). In its Policy Recommendation 
No 8 on Combating Racism While Fighting Terrorism, it asked states to pay particular 
attention to ensuring that no discrimination on grounds such as race, colour, religion, 
nationality, or national or ethnic origin ensues from legislation and regulations – or 
their implementation – in the areas of border control, expulsion, deportation, and 
issuing of visas.
131
 Similarly, in its Report on Terrorism and Human Rights, the Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights has stressed that ‘[m]igrants, asylum 
seekers and other non-nationals are especially vulnerable to discrimination in 
emergency situations resulting from terrorist violence’ and that states ‘must therefore 
remain vigilant in ensuring that their laws and policies are not developed or applied in 
a manner that encourages or results in discrimination.’132 More specifically, the Inter-
American Commission has made it clear that ‘to the extent that [immigration control] 
operations may incorporate criteria, such as national or social origin, that may 
potentially constitute the basis for discrimination, the content and execution of such 
operations must be based upon objective and reasonable justifications that further a 
legitimate purpose, regard being had to the principles which normally prevail in a 
democratic society, and they must be reasonable and proportionate to the end 
sought.’133 
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As becomes apparent from the Inter-American Commission’s comment, the fact that 
the immigration enforcement measures considered here involve distinctions on the 
basis of country of origin or nationality, race, ethnicity, and religion does not 
necessarily mean that they violate the prohibition of discrimination. Government 
actions inevitably classify persons; the crucial question is whether these 
classifications are justified or not. According to the jurisprudence of all the relevant 
human rights bodies and courts, a difference in treatment only violates the right to 
non-discrimination if persons who are in a comparable position are treated differently 
and the differential treatment is not supported by objective and reasonable grounds.
134
 
But before these two issues are considered, it is necessary to determine the standard 
that courts should apply to review the immigration law enforcement practices at issue. 
 
A. Standard of review 
National courts have traditionally exercised great deference towards the executive and 
the legislature as far as policies towards foreign nationals are concerned, particularly 
with regard to their admission and exclusion.
135
 US courts have generally referred to 
Congress’ plenary power over immigration policies136 and British courts to the royal 
prerogative in the field of immigration to justify this deference.
137
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However, this does not mean that courts will automatically exercise self-restraint 
whenever immigration law issues are concerned. In fact, the case law of the courts of 
the third state considered in this Chapter, Germany, demonstrates that there is nothing 
in principle that would prevent the application of the normal principles of judicial 
review to immigration matters. German courts, including the 
Bundesverfassungsgericht, have never viewed national sovereignty as requiring an 
unfettered government power over migration.
138
 In the United States, both 
commentators
139
 and courts
140
 have in recent years started to advocate a similar 
position, characterising the plenary power doctrine, which had emerged in a time of 
expressly racially discriminatory immigration policies (described in Section III 
above), as increasingly out of step with current realities and understandings of the 
appropriate role of the courts. A parallel shift in attitude is observable in the United 
Kingdom.
141
 In the wake of September 11, governments may try to reverse this trend 
towards greater judicial involvement by arguing that in the face of the current terrorist 
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threat they should be allowed to exercise their immigration powers without 
interference by the courts. In this vein, after the London attacks, the then British 
Home Secretary explicitly warned judges not to challenge his decision to deport 
terrorist suspects.
142
 However, the mere fact that a case touches upon national security 
interests is clearly not a sufficient justification for a deferential standard of review.
143
 
  
In the specific context of selective immigration law enforcement policies and 
practices that have been adopted for anti-terrorism purposes, three further elements 
support close judicial scrutiny. 
  
First, even though these initiatives have been adopted in an immigration law context, 
most of them should properly be considered as criminal law enforcement efforts and 
thus be subject to the normal principles of judicial review. This is perhaps most 
obvious with the US Voluntary Interview Program, whose sole purpose appeared to 
be the gathering of information for criminal investigations into terrorism.
144
 Also a 
programme such as the AAI has little to do with immigration law enforcement or 
expedited deportation. In fact, the relevant Department of Justice guidelines make 
clear that arrests of absconders can be carried out without the presence of any 
immigration agents,
145
 that absconders should be treated as criminal suspects,
146
 that 
their names should be entered into a federal criminal database,
147
 and that they should 
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be interviewed about their knowledge of terrorist activity.
148
 Enforcement efforts of a 
clearly criminal law nature such as these cannot escape close judicial scrutiny simply 
because they are targeted at immigrants rather than citizens.  
  
Second, even if these initiatives were characterised as immigration law enforcement, 
strict scrutiny would be called for. This is because where courts have in fact accorded 
the executive broad discretion in this area, they have largely limited it to the treatment 
of foreign nationals who have not yet formally entered the country. In other words, 
governments are given wide latitude to determine the criteria for admission, but once 
an immigrant has entered and begun to develop social ties, courts tend to apply a more 
stringent review.
149
 In the present instance, almost all selective enforcement efforts 
have targeted foreign nationals who had already been residing in the country 
concerned, in many cases for years or even decades. As explained in Section III.2, 
even the US initiative that comes closest to admission control, the special registration 
programme, encompassed not only citizens of specified states entering the United 
States but also those already present within the United States. The same applies to the 
German security vetting process, which is also used in the case of applications for the 
renewal of residence permits. 
  
Third, whereas the case law of national courts and international human rights bodies 
concerning distinctions based on nationality is inconsistent (only the European Court 
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of Human Rights automatically subjects them to strict scrutiny),
150
 differential 
treatment on the grounds of race, ethnicity, and religion is uniformly treated as 
suspect and as entailing strict scrutiny.
151
 This explains why the former US Attorney 
General, John Ashcroft, claimed that the government’s enforcement efforts have been 
targeted according to nationality: ‘We have not identified people based on their ethnic 
origin. We have identified individuals who are not citizens, but based on the country 
which issued their passports.’152 Yet a closer look at these initiatives reveals that, in 
fact, they do not rely on nationality but rather on national origin – and thus on a 
criterion closely linked to race. This is, in part, already apparent from the official 
definitions of the target groups. The Voluntary Interview Program, for example, 
encompassed ‘Iraqi-born’ people,153 while the special registration programme covered 
not only citizens of, but also those born in, the designated states.
154
 This explicit 
reliance on national origin is compounded by the selection of the targeted countries of 
origin, suggesting that this criterion has served as a mere proxy for race and religion: 
both the immigration enforcement efforts based on specific lists of suspicious 
countries and those, like the detention initiatives, where such lists have not been 
drawn up, have been directed almost exclusively at people originating from 
predominantly Arab and/or Muslim countries. In contrast, citizens of Western states 
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where al Qaeda has demonstrably also been active
155
 have been spared the same 
treatment. Thus, the nationality criterion has served to single out a group of people 
whose common defining characteristics are ultimately their race and religion. 
Distinctions based on these immutable characteristics must inevitably entail strict 
judicial scrutiny. 
 
B. Comparability 
The immigration law enforcement efforts considered here involve a difference in 
treatment between, on the one hand, those foreign nationals who originate from 
predominantly Arab and/or Muslim states and, on the other, those who come from 
other countries. For a discrimination challenge to succeed, it must be established that 
these two groups are in a comparable, that is, analogous or relevantly similar, 
situation, judged in relation to the purpose of the differential treatment.
156
 In the 
present instance, the selective enforcement of immigration powers serves as a means 
for the identification and prevention of terrorist activity. In relation to this aim, the 
two groups are in an analogous situation. First, potential terrorists, including Islamist 
terrorists, may not only be citizens of Arab or Muslim countries but also of other 
states. As I will explain in detail in the following section, many of those so far 
identified as having been involved in Islamist terrorist activities have, in fact, come 
from Western states. Second, persons belonging to both groups could, theoretically, 
be targeted equally through immigration law enforcement efforts, since all foreign 
nationals are subject to the host state’s immigration powers. Thus, the two groups are 
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in a comparable situation and their differential treatment can only be compatible with 
the right to non-discrimination if it is supported by an objective and reasonable 
justification. 
 
C. Objective and reasonable justification 
As I have pointed out in Section IV.A, there are good reasons to argue that the 
differences in treatment examined here should be characterised as classifications 
based on race and religion. According to the jurisprudence of both international 
human rights bodies and national courts, differential treatment based solely on these 
grounds is automatically suspect and will always be difficult to justify. The British 
House of Lords, for example, has held that racial stereotyping by immigration officers 
is impermissible even if it is based on assumptions that may very likely be true.
157
 
Consequently, even if it could somehow be established that non-citizens of Arab 
origin or Muslim denomination are more likely to be involved in terrorism than other 
foreign nationals, courts might overturn selective immigration enforcement measures 
that are clearly based on these criteria.  
  
If, on the other hand, the government position is followed, according to which the 
distinctions at issue are based on the immigrants’ country of nationality, the question 
as to whether the differential treatment may be justified needs to be examined more 
closely. The inquiry as to the existence of an objective and reasonable justification is 
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generally divided into the following two sub-tests.
158
 First, does the difference in 
treatment pursue a legitimate aim? Second, is there a reasonable relationship of 
proportionality between the difference in treatment and the legitimate aim sought to 
be realised? As far as the first requirement is concerned, the aim of the immigration 
law enforcement efforts at issue is the prevention of terrorist attacks. Undoubtedly, 
this constitutes a legitimate, even compelling, governmental interest. The decisive 
question is therefore whether singling out citizens of predominantly Arab and/or 
Muslim states for enhanced immigration enforcement efforts is a proportionate means 
of achieving this aim. It is helpful to examine the question of proportionality in two 
steps, relating, first, to the suitability and effectiveness of the selective enforcement 
efforts at issue and, second, to their possible negative effects. 
 
1. Suitability and effectiveness 
It is doubtful in two respects that the kind of immigration law enforcement measures 
described in this Chapter are a suitable and effective, and thus proportionate, means to 
detect and prevent terrorist activity. First, there are inherent limits to the usefulness of 
a strategy that relies on immigration law powers to counter terrorism. Second, a 
person’s country of origin or nationality is not an appropriate criterion to target the 
enforcement of these powers for anti-terrorism purposes. 
  
The first problem is due to the fact that immigration control systems are not able – or 
even intended – to identify international terrorists. The restrictive measures provided 
by these systems can only be deployed effectively as far as intelligence and criminal 
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law agencies provide information as to potential targets.
159
 Thus, the general 
strengthening and strict enforcement of immigration laws are, in themselves, unlikely 
to disrupt the activities of foreign terrorists – unless, perhaps, a state goes as far as 
completely closing its borders and expelling all foreign nationals. As a senior Western 
intelligence official put it, ‘tightening immigration control doesn’t help you that much 
until the intelligence side gives you a name, and then it helps you track them.’160 This 
statement is reinforced by the findings of the 9/11 Commission, which concluded that 
the attacks of that date were made possible mainly by the intelligence agencies’ 
failure to properly assess and share information.
161
 Furthermore, many immigration 
law enforcement efforts, including the AAI and the use of immigration charges to 
hold potential terrorists, are only directed at those who are in violation of the 
immigration law. Yet foreign terrorists are not necessarily illegally in the country they 
are planning to attack. In fact, a study of 373 Islamist terrorists arrested or killed in 
Europe and the United States between 1993 and 2004 showed that only six per cent of 
them had entered the respective host country illegally.
162
 Finally, even as far as 
immigration control measures do affect terrorists, their effectiveness is very limited: 
exclusion and deportation merely relocate the structural components of terrorism 
rather than to seriously disturb or eliminate them.
163
 The British Newton Committee, a 
committee of Privy Counsellors set up to review the operation of the ATCSA, 
therefore concluded:  
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 Seeking to deport terrorist suspects does not seem to us to be a 
satisfactory response, given the risk of exporting terrorism … While 
deporting such people might free up British police, intelligence, security 
and prison service resources, it would not necessarily reduce the threat to 
British interests abroad, or make the world a safer place more generally. 
Indeed, there is a risk that the suspects might even return without the 
authorities being aware of it.
164
 
 
In summary, while the use of immigration powers may be, for the reasons explained 
in Section II above, an attractive and convenient option for governments to react to 
terrorist threats, it is also a largely ineffective one. 
 
The second concern, relating to the suitability and effectiveness of the selective 
enforcement approach, derives from the fact that a lack of reliable and specific 
information on terrorists cannot be compensated for by the use of stereotypes. Such a 
broad criterion as a person’s country of origin or nationality is not narrowly tailored 
enough to target effectively immigration law enforcement efforts for anti-terrorism 
purposes. To subject all nationals of certain states to enhanced scrutiny and 
particularly harsh treatment clearly runs counter to the principle of proportionality. 
This is all the more true given that there is no evidence for a possible connection 
between a person’s nationality and his or her likelihood to be involved in terrorism. 
The mere fact that someone comes from a country where there has been al Qaeda 
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presence or activity can hardly be regarded as a compelling indication of 
dangerousness. After all, as highlighted by Legomsky, immigrants are not 
representatives of the countries they leave behind: ‘Countries don’t immigrate. People 
do.’165 Thus, reliance on a stereotypical, overbroad criterion instead of specific 
information relating to individuals makes the selective enforcement efforts at issue 
unsuitable and disproportionate means of countering terrorism. It is for this reason, for 
example, that the UN High Commissioner for Refugees has expressed concern about 
the mandatory detention of asylum seekers based on nationality under the US 
Operation Liberty Shield: ‘Detention of asylum seekers … should be based on an 
individualized assessment of the security risk the person poses. Blanket mandatory 
detention based on nationality varies from accepted international human rights norms 
and standards.’166  
  
It is, in any event, difficult to discern the logic behind the selection of the states whose 
nationals have been targeted by the measures under consideration. As explained in 
Section III.2, the immigration law enforcement efforts of all three states considered 
have concentrated almost exclusively on (primarily male) citizens of around twenty to 
twenty-five Arab and/or Muslim states where there has, allegedly, been al Qaeda 
presence or activity. Yet, at the same time, a list compiled by the US Department of 
State of ‘Countries Where Al Qaeda Has Operated’ comprised forty-five states, 
including numerous Western countries such as France, Germany, Switzerland, the 
United Kingdom, and the United States, while excluding some of the Middle Eastern 
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states singled out by the initiatives at issue, such as Syria.
167
 Furthermore, the study of 
Islamist terrorists referred to above showed that less than half of these terrorists were 
born in the Middle East and that 41 per cent of them were nationals of Western states; 
there were more Britons than Yemenis, Sudanese, or Libyans and twice as many 
French nationals as Saudis.
168
 Therefore, if a link between the country of nationality 
and terrorist involvement was to be made, then nationals of Western states would 
have to be targeted as well. In this sense, the selective immigration law enforcement 
efforts at issue are not only over-inclusive in that they rely on the broad, 
disproportionate criterion of country of nationality: they are also under-inclusive in 
that they fail to include within their scope a large portion of potential terrorists. To 
conclude, the perception that terrorism is part of a wider cultural conflict, as well as 
considerations of political feasibility, have led states to use a proxy for terrorist threats 
that is overbroad, under-inclusive, and inappropriate. 
  
It is therefore not surprising that there is no evidence that would suggest that these 
selective enforcement measures have been effective. For example, not one of the tens 
of thousands of immigrants registered under the US special registration programme 
has been charged with terrorist activity.
169
 Similarly, the mass of information resulting 
from the Voluntary Interview Program has not even been properly analysed, and the 
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project has apparently not produced any investigative leads.
170
 Of the few individuals 
who were taken into custody based on the interviews, most were charged with minor 
immigration violations; none of these cases seem to have any connection to 
terrorism.
171
 This lack of effectiveness reinforces the conclusion that there is no 
compelling link between the traits relied on for these law enforcement initiatives and 
terrorist activity. 
 
2. Negative effects 
A proportionality assessment of the sort of immigration law enforcement practices 
described in this Chapter must also take account of their wider implications. The 
available evidence suggests that such selective enforcement methods may have 
serious negative impacts on community relations and thus ultimately prove to be an 
impediment to anti-terrorism efforts. 
  
These counter-productive effects are, again, best documented for the selective 
enforcement programmes implemented by the US authorities. A series of interviews 
carried out by an independent research institute with representatives of Arab and 
Muslim communities in the United States demonstrates that these groups feel targeted 
and isolated by the government’s policies described above.172 One interviewee stated 
that the cumulative effect of all these measures for the Muslim community had been 
‘isolating instead of integrating.’173 The special registration programme has even 
prompted an exodus of some immigrant groups from the United States; in one 
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Brooklyn neighbourhood alone, an estimated 15,000 Pakistanis left.
174
 This also 
shows that selective immigration law enforcement efforts impact upon a much wider 
group than only those directly affected by them: by singling out a particular category 
of foreign nationals, they intimidate, alienate, and stigmatise all those who share the 
relevant characteristics. 
  
This sense of intimidation and alienation within certain immigrant communities has 
important consequences in terms of their readiness to cooperate with law enforcement 
agencies – cooperative law enforcement depends upon mutual trust.175 Given that the 
collection of intelligence in investigations into international terrorist networks also 
depends on good sources in immigrant communities,
176
 this may be extremely costly 
in the longer term. As a former CIA counter-terrorism official has pointed out: 
‘[W]hen we alienate the communities, particularly immigrant communities, we 
undermine the very basis of our intelligence collection abilities because we need to 
have the trust and cooperation of people in those communities.’177 It is precisely for 
this reason that in the United States several local police departments refused to 
participate in the Voluntary Interview Program; such selective enforcement efforts, 
they argued, could jeopardise the trust with immigrant communities that they had 
built up over the years.
178
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Even more fundamentally, measures singling out immigrants who originate from 
Middle Eastern and Muslim states for particularly harsh treatment contribute to the 
construction of the concept of a ‘clash of civilizations’.179 Through their choice of the 
targeted countries of nationality, they reinforce the notion that terrorism is but a 
manifestation of a broader, cultural and religious, conflict. It is exactly this notion 
that, in turn, is one of the most powerful arguments used by Islamist terrorist 
organisations themselves to recruit new members, including second- and third-
generation immigrants in Western states.
180
 
 
3. Result 
Immigration law enforcement efforts focusing on citizens of predominantly Arab 
and/or Muslim states treat two groups differently who are in a comparable situation: 
immigration law enforcement agencies could equally target foreign nationals 
originating from other states for anti-terrorism purposes. Because these measures 
serve criminal (rather than immigration) law enforcement purposes and because they 
will often affect immigrants who reside in the host country, courts should employ 
strict scrutiny to review discrimination challenges to them. Thus, the differential 
treatment they involve could only be justified if it is supported by compelling reasons.  
  
Yet in a terrorism context there are no objective and reasonable grounds for making 
distinctions between different categories of foreign nationals according to their 
country of origin or nationality. Even though singling out people for special treatment 
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based on their nationality is always problematic from a discrimination perspective, it 
may be understandable that a state considers a non-citizen’s country of nationality a 
relevant factor of a risk assessment if it is involved in an armed conflict with that 
country. Thus, a US court held during the Tehran hostage crisis that there was a 
‘rational basis’ for a regulation requiring Iranian students to report to the immigration 
authorities.
181
 For the purpose of the fight against terrorism, however, a person’s 
nationality is irrelevant. The purported ‘war on terror’ is not an inter-state conflict, 
and policies that aim at excluding or removing all nationals of certain states are 
grounded in a traditional conception of security that is unhelpful in the context of 
contemporary international terrorism. This is a conception that emphasises territory 
instead of people and thus implies that terrorism can somehow be linked to certain 
states, that all nationals of these states can be treated as unitary actors and that the 
threat can be addressed through the protection of the borders. Yet, in reality, 
immigration law enforcement can only contribute to the prevention of terrorism if it is 
based on a detailed, individualised appreciation of the threat and concrete 
information. Enforcement efforts that rely on broad stereotypes such as nationality or 
national origin, in contrast, are unsuitable and ineffective, and thus disproportionate, 
means to counter terrorism. As a consequence, they violate the right to non-
discrimination as guaranteed by international human rights standards and national 
law. 
 
V. CONCLUSION 
With the portrayal of contemporary terrorism as a war-like phenomenon rooted in 
fundamental cultural differences and, thus, as primarily emanating from abroad, the 
                                                 
181
 Narenji v. Civiletti 617 F2d 745, 748 (DC Cir, 1979). 
reinforcement of the borders and the removal of potential security risks from the 
country may seem a logical response. It is a way of reacting to national security crises 
that has a long tradition. It is, at the same time, a way of reacting that is characteristic 
of the risk management approach that underlies today’s crime-fighting strategies in 
general.
182
 Especially the use of deportation powers to counter terrorism may be seen 
as the archetypical manifestation of this approach: relocating rather than resolving 
potential threats, deportation is primarily aimed at producing a short-term sense of 
security. Yet the impression of security created by the adoption of immigration 
restrictions is – even in the short term – a false one. With the huge numbers of people 
crossing borders every day,
183
 it is – at least for a society that wants to stay relatively 
open – a close to impossible task to filter out potential terrorists. As is widely 
acknowledged, even vastly expanded immigration powers and border controls could 
not have prevented the September 11 hijackers from entering the United States.
184
 In 
the longer term, and certainly from a global perspective, risk management strategies 
such as deportation may actually be counterproductive, since potential terrorists may 
be better able to operate from the states to which they are deported.
185
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The use of immigration laws as an anti-terrorism tool is also typical of the risk 
management approach in another respect: since prediction and prevention of risks is at 
the heart of this approach, it relies on profiles of the potential targets. As the figure of 
the contemporary terrorist lacks particular psychological or behavioural 
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